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*  I am deeply  indebted  to Ramon  Lopez  and Vinod  Thomas  for discussions
at various  stages  of this  work.  Comments  from  Bela  Balassa,  Christopher
Clague,  Michael  Finger,  Faezeh  Foroutan,  Kazi  Matin,  and John  Nash  on
earlier  drafts  of the  paper  are gratefully  acknowledged.In the  course  of trade-policy  reforms,  countries  must  confront  at least
two  important  ques;ions  with respect  to tariffs.1 First,  what is  the  optimal
structure  of tariffs? In  particular,  is It  optimal  to tax  all Imports  at a
uniform  rate? Second,  should  intermediate  inputs  be subject  to import  duties
and  if  so Is  there  a role  for  duty  drawbacks  on  exports? In  the  present  paper
I seek  answer  to these  important  questions  in  the  context  of  a price-taking
small  open  economy.
A central  result  In the  pure  theory  of international  trade  is that  in  the
nbsence  of distortions  a welfare  maximizing  small  open  economy  should  not
npose  any  restrictions  on foreign  trade. Yet in  practice,  few  countries
ihere  to the  policy  of free trade. A variety  of objectives  and  constraints
result  in  the  adoption  of trade  restrictions.  Three  objectives  which  figure
prominently  in  this  context  are  self  sufficiency,  protection  and  revenue.2 In
'In  the  interest  of simplicity  and tractability,  the  discussion  in this  paper
is limited  to tariffs. Other  types  of intervention  including  quotas  and
domestic  taxes  are  obviously  important  but  for  most  part I  choose  to  abstract
from  them.  In  any  case,  if  quotas  are  to  be replaced  by tariffs,  it is
Important  to  know the  optimal  structure  of the  latter  under  different
circumstances.
2It  may  be noted  thai.  tariffs  are  not  the  first-best  instrument  for  achieving
the  protection  and  revenue  objectives  unless  administrative  costs  rule  out
domestic  taxes  as a viable  source  of revenue. If  domestlc  taxes  can  be
1addition,  administrative  convenience  and  political-economy  considerations  play
a  major  role  in the  determination  of a country's  trade  policy. Assuming  that
one  or more  of these  objectives  must  be met,  the issue  Is  how  best  to  achieve
them.
In the  present  paper  I  synthesize  and  refine  the  existing  literature
aimed  at answering  this  Important  question. I  also  raise  some  new issues
which  have important  implications  for trade  policy  reforms  in  developing
countries. Special  attention  Is  paid to  the  treatment  of Imported
Intermediate  Inputs  and the  role  of duty  drawbacks  on exports  In  the  design  of
trade  policy. A  distinguishing  feature  of the  paper  is Its  intuitive  but
rigorous  approach. The  analysis  in the  text  Is  presented  with the  help  of
graphs  and  minimal  amount  of algebra;  all  complicated  proofs  appear  in  an
appendix  available  upon  request  from  the  author.
An additional  contribution  of the  paper is  the  elaboration  of the
political-economy  case  for  uniform  tariffs. In  conversations,  practitioners
often  assert  that  political-economy  considerations  constitute  an Important
reason  for  preferring  uniform  over  nonuniform  tariffs. Yet to  my  knowledge,
the  reasoning  behind  this  assertion  has simply  not  been laid  out  clearly.
Broadly  speaking,  the  literature  addressing  the Issues  mentioned  above
has  followed  one  of two  traditions:  the  International  Economics  tradition  or
Public  Economics  tradition.  Models  which  follow  the  former  tradition  assume
that  total  factor  supplies  are  fixed. Labor-leisure  choice  plays  no role  in
these  models. Moreover,  lump-sum  taxes  are  available  via  a uniform  production
or consumption  tax  on all  commodities.  Among  key contributions  In this
tradition  are  Johnson  (1964),  Ramaswami  and  Srinivasan  (1968),  Bhagwati  and
imposed,  within  the  fixed  factor-endowments  framework,  revenue  can  be raised
costlessly  by a uniform  consumption  or  value  added  tax.
2Srinivasan  (1969)  and  Corden  (1974).
Papers  written  In  the  Public  Economics  tradition  assume  that  factors  are
supplied  elastically.  Labor-leisure  choice  plays  a central  role In  these
papers. The  authors  writing  In this  tradition  are  concerned  solely  with
revenue  raising  taxes. Lump-sum  taxes  are  not  available  here  and  Ramsey
(1927)  considerations  play  a key  role  In the  determination  of optimal  taxes.
The  most Important  contributions  in  this  tradition  from the  viewpoint  of trade
taxes  are  Boadway  et al (1973),  Dasgupta  and  Stiglitz  (1974)  and  Dixit  (1985).
At a more  general  level,  the  seminal  contribution  remains  Diamond  and  Mirrlees
(1971).
The  present  paper  follows  exclusively  the  International  Economics
tradition. Thus,  factor  endowments  are  assume  to  be constant  throughout. In
the  early  part  of the  paper,  I  rely  heavily  on a diagrammatic  technique
introduced  by Johnson  (1964). Towards  the  end  of the  paper,  I  give  a brief
summary  of the  literature  in  both International  and  Public  Economics
traditions.
The  paper  is  organized  as follows. In  Section  1, I  discuss  the  optimal
tariff  structure  in  the  presence  of self-sufficiency,  protection  and  revenue
objectives.  For  simplicity,  It is  assumed  in this  section  that  there  are  no
intermediate  inputs  and  nontraded  goods. In  Sections  2 and  3, I  introduce
successively  pure intermediate  inputs  and  nontraded  goods. The  principal
Issue  In these  sections  Is  whether  or  not imported  Inputs  should  be subject  to
tariffs  and if  yes  whether  the  latter  should  be combined  with  duty  drawbacks
on exports. Se'ction  4  discusses  the  case  for  and  against  the  uniform  tariff.
I  argue  that  the  case  for  uniformity  must  be based  on administrative
convenience,  transparency  and  political-economy  considerations  rather  than
efficiency. Finally,  Section  5  gives  a  brief  history  of t,he  l't'rature  and
Section  6 summarizes  the  paper.
31.  Optimal  Tariffs  under  Alternative  Obiectives
Let  us begin  with  a discussion  of optimal  tariffs  in  the  presence  of
alternative  constraints.  TO keep  matters  simple,  we will  not  attempt  to
derive  the  actual  optimal  tariff  rates  but  simply  discuss  why they  do or  do
not  assume  the  uniform  structure. The  existence  of all  distortions  including
domestic  taxes  will  be assumed  away.  Implications  of these  distortions  for
the  optimal  tariff  structure  will  be mentioned  briefly  in  Section  5.
In  this  section,  I  will  assume  that  all  goods  are  traded  and that  there
are  no Intermediate  inputs. As our Interest  Is limited  to  a small  country,  we
will  assume  that  the  world  prices  are  fixed. Indeed.  throughout  the  paper.  by
appropriate  choice  of  units,  we  will set  all  world  prices  equal  to  unity.3
1.1  The  Import  Obtective
Let  us assume  that  motivated  by self-sufficiency  considerations,  the
country  is interested  In limiting  the  value  of  net Imports  of  a group  of
commodities  to  a fixed  level. This  group  may  consist  of some  or all
importables  and  may  even include  exportables.  We will  demonstrate  that  the
cost  of satisfying  this  import  constraint  is  minimized  bv subjecting  all
imports  to a  uniform  tariff  (or  subsidy  in  the  case  of  exports'  4
Assume  that  we want  to limit  the  value  of imports,  at world  prices,  of
commodities  1  and  2 to  some  prespecified  level. In  Figure  1, let  us depict
3Thus, if  1.5  ounces  of steel  costs  $1,  we measure  steel  In  units  of 1.5
ounces  each.
4This result  is  valid  in the  presence  of intermediate  inputs  as well  as
nontraded  goods. A proof  within  the  general-equilibrium  model  is  provided  in
the  appendix  available  upon  request  from  the  author.
4the  demand  and  supply  curves  of the  two  comr -Aties.  In  the  first  quadrant,
I  have  drawn  the  demand  and  supply  curves  for  commodity  I in the  usual
fashion. In  the  second  quadrant,  the  sdme is  done  for  commodity  2 with
positive  quantities  measured  to  the  left  from  the  origin. It  Is important  to
remember  that  we have  chosen  the  units  of various  goods  sc  as to  equate  the
worle  tce  of  each  good  equal  to  unity. Therefore,  the  horizontal  axis in
Figu.  ,.  gives  not  only the  quantity  of the  two  goods  but  their  value (at
world  prices)  as  well.  Under  free  trade,  quantities  consumed  and  produced  of
the  two  goods  are  given  by Intersections  of line  DM  with the  relevant  demand
and  supply  curves.
Let  us now suppose  that  the  value  of imports  is  to  be limited  to  X  C  +
X2C2. This  objective  can  be accomplished  by a uniform  tariff  on the  two
commodities  at rate  t.  The  welfare  loss  due to the  tariff  Is  given  by the  sum
of triangles  Indicated  by a,  b, c, and  d.  The important  question  is  whether
one  can  do better  by taxing  one  commodity  at a higher  rate  and  the  other  one
at  a lower  rate  than  t.  The  answer  to this  question  is in  the  negative.
Suppose  we lower  the  tariff  on good  1  and  raise  that  on good  2 by just
enough  to  raise  the Imports  of good 1  by $1 and lower  those  of  good  2 by the
same  amount.  These  changes  will leave  unchanged  the  total  value  of Imports  of
the  two  goods. But  giver  hat the  marginal  costs  of reducing  imports  in the
5Unless  otherwise  specified,  the  diagrammatic  analysis  will  be based  on the
assumption  that  cross  effects  are  absent. It Is  shown  In  the  appendix  that  as
long  as complementarities  in import  demand  are  not  strong,  presence  of cross
effects  will  not  alter  our  results.
Observe  that  due to  partial-equilibrium  nature  of the  analysis,  our
c,fistruction  in  Figure  1  does  not  incorporate  the  substitution  which  takes
place  between  goods  1  and  2 on the  one  hand  and  exports  on the  other.
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5-awo goods  were  equal  at the  uniform  tariff  rate  t, a higher  t'riff  on good  2
.id  lower  one  on good 1  will result  in  an increase  In  the  cost  of achieving
the  import  objective. It is  easy  to  verify  that  a rise  in tariff  on good  1
and  decline  in that  on  good  2 will lead  to the  same  conclusion.
Several  points  deserve  to  be noted. First,  it Is  evident  that  for  a
given  value  of imports,  the  larger  the  number  of commodities  in  the
constraint,  the  greater  the  welfare  cost  of achieving  the  objective. Thus,  if
we were to  add  another  commodity  in  our  example  above,  we will  have  to impose
a higher  tariff  (than  t)  on all  three  commodities  in  order  to  hold their
combined  Imports  at the  level  indicated  by XICI  + X2C2.
Second,  as already  noted,  tariffs  (or  equivalent  quotas)  are  the  first
best instrument  of meeting  the  import  constraint. Imports  are  reduced  most
effectively  by reducing  consumption  as well  as Increasing  production.  A
t riff  affects  these  variables  simultaneously  in the  correct  direction. By
c -itrast,  a consumption  tax  or production  subsidy  will  work  on only  one  of the
two  variables  and impose  a greater  excess  burden  on the  economy.
Finally,  if  externalities  or other  distortions  are  present  in the
economy,  optimal  tariff  structure  will  be nonuriform  and  it  will  fail  to re,-h
the  first  best.  The  first  best  will  require  a combination  of tariffs  and  the
best  instrument  to  correct  the  existing  distortion.  For  a detailed  discussion
of this  issue,  see  Panagariya  (1980,  1983).
1.2  The  Protection  Objective
Let  us now  assume  that  the  government  is interested  in  maintaining  the
value  (at  world  prices)  of output  of a  group  of commodities  at a fixed  level.
The common  rat'onale  behind  this  objective  is  that it  is  necessary  to  build  a
manufacturing  base in  order  foster  sustained  growth. To the  extent  that
producers  respond  to  the  domestic  profit  opportunities  more  readily  than  to
.uch  opportunities  available  abroad  and  to the  extent  that  profit
6opportunities  In  the  domestic  manufacturing  sector  are limited  In the  early
stages  of development,  It  may  make  sense  to  protect  the  manufacturing  sector
for  a  while.
It  Is  easy to  show  that  the  best  instrument  to  achieve  the  protection
jective  is  an output  subsidy. Moreover,  the  optimal  subsidy  structure
involves  a uniform  ad  valorem  subsidy  to  all  Industries  Included  in  the
protected  group  and  no intervention  in the  remaining  Industries  (see  Johnson,
1964  and  Vandendorpe,  1974). I. terms  of  Figure  1,  suppose  we want to  ensure
that  the  combined  value  of output  of goods;  1  and  2 is  no less  than  OXI  + OX2'
The  optimal  way to  achieve  this  objective  will  be to subsidize  the  output  of
both  goods  at rate  t.  The  reader  may  verify  that  any  deviations  from  this
policy  will result  in  a larger  welfare  cost.
It is important  to  recognize  that  the  conclusion  stated  in the  previous
paragraph  depends  critically  on the  assumption  that  revenues  can  be raised
costlessly. If  this  assumption  is  not  true,  output  subsidies  by themselves
will  not  be an optimal  instrument  of protection.  Optimality  will involve
combining  the  protection  constraint  with  a revenue  constraint  and  solving  for
the  relevant  tax-subsidy  structure  simultaneously.  In the  Diamond-Mirrlees
type  of  models  this  will involve  consumption  taxes  to  raise  revenue  and  output
subsidies  to  meet the  protection  objective. In  the  present  model  with  fixed
endowments,  a uniform  tax  on consumption  (or  production)  will  enable  us to
raise  revenue  without  any  excess  burden  which  can  be used  then  to  subsidize
the  industries  in  the  protected  group.
An alternative  to the  above  option  is  the  use  of tariffs. Tariffs  can
provide  the  protection  being  sought  without  raising  the  revenue  Problem.
Three  points  deserve  to  be noted  with  respect  to  optimal  tariffs  aimed  at
achieving  the  protection  objective. First,  the  outcome  achieved  via tariffs
will  be inferior  to that  achieved  via  a combination  of revenue-raising  taxes
7and  output  subsidies  as  described  In  the  previous  paragraph. 7
Second,  the  outcome  with  tariffs  alone  will  also  be inferior  to  what  can
be achieved  by combining  them  with  output  subsidies. If  tariffs  alone  are
used,  their  level  will  be  higher  than  when they  are  combined  with  output
subsidies.  For instance,  In  Figure  1,  if  tariffs  alone  are  used  to raise  the
value  of output  of the  two  goods  to  OX+IOX, the  required  rate  of (uniform)
tariff  will  be t.  But If  we combine  tariffs  and  subsidies,  we can lower  the
tariff  below  t and  compensate  for  the  reduced  protection  by Introducing  an
output  subsidy  financed  by the  tariff  revenue. In  this  manner,  we will  be
able  to  reduce  the  distortion  in  consumption.  The  optimal  structure  of
tariffs,  when combined  with  output  subsidies,  Is  nonuniform  in  general. The
reason  Is  that  tariffs  distort  consumption  and,  moreover,  revenue  raising
tariff  are  typically  nonuniform. 8
Finally,  uniform  tariffs  can  be justified  as an optimal  means  of
protection  only  when tariffs  alone  are  used  and  we ignore  the  distortion  in
consumption  caused  by them.  As It is  arbitrary  to ignore  the  distortion  In
consumption,  this  case  for  uniform  tariffs  is  very  weak.
The  last  point  Is illustrated  in  Figure  2  where  demand  Is  more  elastic
and  supply  less  elastic  for  good  1 than  for  good  2.  Suppose  the  country  wants
t  maintain  the  total  value  of  output  of the  two  goods  at X2XI. This
o!jective  can  be accomplished  by taxing  imports  at the  uniform  rate  t.  The
q- stlon  which  arises  then  is  whether  the  country  can  do better  by taxing
7Of course,  in  some  developing  countries,  tariffs  may  be the  only  way  to raise
revenue  In  which  case they  become  the  first  best  instrument  to  achieve  the
protection  objective.
8I  discuss  the  revenue-raising  optimal  tariffs  in  Section  1.3.
8\N  ;~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.
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/V)  ~~~8-a, Imports  at  different  rates. It Is  easy  to  see  that  if  we Ignore  the
distortion  in  consumption,  nonuniform  tariffs  will  make things  worse. Thus,
if  we lower  the  tariff  on  good 1  to t1 and  raise  that  on  good  2 to t 2 such
that  X2XI  =  X2X',  the  additional  loss  represented  by the  shaded  area  under
S2S2  will  be  necessarily  higher  than  the  additional  gain  represented  by the
shaded  area  under  SIS 1. It Is  easy to  see  that  the  same  Is  also  true  if  we
tax  the  Imports  of  good 1  at a higher  rate  and  those  of  good  2 at a lower
rate.
This  conclusion  changes,  however,  if  we Incorporate  the  consumption
distortion  into  the  analysis. Thus  In  Figure  2, the  gain  In  consumption  in
good  1 (the  shaded  area  under  DIDI)  due  to the  lowering  of tariff  Is  so large
relative  to the  loss  In  consumption  In  good  2 (shaded  area  under  D2  D2)  due to
the  raising  of tariff  that  It  more  than  offsets  the  net  loss  via Increased
production  distortion.  Nonuniform  tariffs  can  do better  than  a uniform
tariff.
1.3  The  Revenue  Oblective
In  recent  years,  the  greatest  concern  In the  literature  and  at the  Bank
was  been  with the  revenue  objective. The  optimal  prescription  In the  presence
of this  objective  depends  critically  on  whether  or not  there  are  rents  In the
economy. These  rents  may  take  the  form  of profits  or returns  to lnelastically
supplied  factors.9 If  rents  are  present,  revenue  can  be raised  without
distortion  by taxing  such  rents. For Instance,  we are  assuming  that  all
factors  of  production  are  supplied  lnelastically.  Therefore,  revenue  can  be
9tlnless  otherwise  noted,  the  term  "inelastic  supply"  must  be Interpreted  to
m  in  zero  elasticity  of supply. By extension,  "elastic  supply"  Implies
r  ;ltive  elasticity  of supply.
9raised  costlessly  via  a tax  on these  factors. An Indirect  way to tax  the
factors  In the  present  context  is to tax  the  production  or consumption  of all
goods  at a uniform  rate.  °
The  policy  prescription  is  more  complicated  when  some  or all  factors  of
production  are  supplied  elastically  as in  the  papers  written  In the  Public
Economics  tradition  (e.g.,  Diamond  and  Mirrlees  (1971)  and  Dasgupta  and
Stlglitz  (1974)).  Here the  first  step  Is  to tax  the  rents  available  in the
frm  of profits  or returns  to inelastically  suppiied  factors.12 An indirect
way to  perform  this  task  is  to tax  the  consumption  of  all  commodities  and
subsidize  the  use  of all  elastically  supplied  factors  at a uniform  rate.  13
This  policy  change  does  not  introduce  any  distortions  in the  economy. If  the
revenue  so raised  is  below  the  target,  however,  the  optimal  policy  Involves  a
100%  tax  on  all  rents  including  profits  and  consumption  taxes/subsidies  on
goods  and  factors  along  the  Ramsey-Diamond-Mirrlees  lines  (see  Dasgupta  and
Stiglitz  1974,  and  Dixit  1985  for  details).
A common  problem  with  respect  to this  last  policy  is that  In  practice  it
Is  very  difficult  to  tax  all  rents  at a 100%  rate. Moreover,  few  countries
10In  the  presence  of Intermediate  inputs  and  fixed  endowments,  a value  added
tax  rather  than  production  tax  should  be  used.
1 An  obvious  example  of elastically  supplied  factor  Is  leisure.
12The  standard  example  here  is land.
13For  example,  if labor  is the  only  elastically  supplied  factor,  we should  tax
the  consumption  of  all  goods  and  subsidize  the  employment  of labor  at a
uniform  ad valorem  rate. The  wage subsidy  is  equivalent  to  a tax  on leisure.
Therefore,  a uniform  consumption  tax  and  wage  subsidy  leaves  the  relative
prices  of all  goods  (including  labor)  unchanged.
10are  willing  to make  factor  subsidies  a part  of taxation  schemes  aimed  at
raising  revenue. Under  such  circumstances,  optimal  revenue  raising  taxes  must
Include  both  production  and  consumption  taxes  or,  equivalently,  production  and
trade  taxes. This  point,  made  formally  in  Dasgupta  and  Stiglitz  (1974),  is
often  overlooked  with the  result  that  only  consumption  taxes/subsidies  and  not
production  and  trade  taxes  are  considered  to  be a part  of optimal  tax  package.
In the  remainder  of this  subsection,  I  wish to  demonstrate  that  if  a
country  is  forced  to rely  exclusively  on trade  taxes  for  revenues,  the  optimal
structure  of such  taxes  will  be nonuniform.  4  This  point  is  well recognized
but  an Intuitive  explanation  of it  helps  clarify  a common  confusion. It is
sometimes  thought  that  if  we ignore  the  distortion  in  consumption,  uniform
tariffs  will  be optimal. This  conclusion  Is true  only  when the  objective  is
protection  but  not  when the  country  is  constrained  by a revenue  requirement.
Consider  Figure  3  which  Is similar  to  Figure  1.  Note that  the  demand  and
supply  curves  for  good 1  are  more  elastic  than  the  corresponding  curves  for
good  2.  Therefore,  the  elasticity  of  demand  for imports  is  higher  for  good 1
than  for  good  2.  Maintaining  the  assumption  of  zero  cross  effects,  I  will
demonstrate  that  good 1  should  be taxed  at  a lower  rate  than  good  2.
Suppose  we want  to raise  revenue  in  the  amount  represented  by areas  ABDE
plus  FGJH.  The  uniform  rate  which  will  accomplish  this  task is  given  by t.
The  accompanying  welfare  cost  Is  represented  by the  sum  of triangles  ALE,  BDM,
NFH  and  GRJ.  It Is  easy  to see  that  the  same  revenue  can  be raised  at a lower
14It  is  worth  reminding  that  given  our  assumption  of fixed  factor  endowments,
the  optimal  policy  is  to tax  consumption  or production  at a  uniform  rate.
This  point  Is  often  forgotten. Thus,  it is  not  uncommon  to  use a  fixed
e.-lowments  model  for  trade  policy  analysis  and  assert  that  the  optimal  policy









1~~~1-cost  by taxing  good  2 more  heavily  and  good 1 less  heavily. Thus,  tariffs  at
rates  tIand  t2 subtract  areas  c  and  d (vertically  shaded)  from  and  add  areas  a
and  b (horizontally  shaded)  to the  welfare  cost. The  net  effect  Is  favorable.
Observe  that  even  if  we were  to ignore  the  distortion  in  consumption,  a
uniform  tariff  u.ll  be nonoptimal  in the  present  situation.  Relative  to the
uniform  rate t,  tariff  rates  tI  and t2  imply  a gain  of area  c and  a loss  of
area  b due to  changes  in  production  distortion.  Given  the  relative  supply
elasticities  in  the  two  sectors,  area  c is  larger  than  area  b.
This last  result  demonstrates  the  critical  importance  of the  motive
behind  tariffs  in  determining  their  optimal  structure. If  the  motive  is
protection  and  we ignore  the  distortion  in  consumption,  a uniform  tariff  will
be the  right  policy. But if  the  motive  is revenue,  a uniform  tariff  will  fail
to  minimize  the  distortion  cost  even in  production.  The reason  for  this
difference  in  results,  in  terms  of Figure  3, is  that  in  pursuing  the
protection  objective  we want to  hold  the  horizontal  distance  constant  whereas
under  the  revenue  constraint  we wish  to  fix  an area  which  necessarily  has  a
horizontal  as well  as vertical  dimension. In  the  latter  case,  elasticities  of
the  relevant  curves  matter.
To understand  the  point  intuitively,  consider  a  good  whose  supply  is
entirely  Inelastic.  Clearly,  a tariff  on this  good  will  not  help  promote  the
protection  objective. But  if the  objective  is  revenue,  this  good is  an ideal
candidate;  all  revenue  can  be raised  by taxing  this  good  at no social  cost
(ignoring  the  distortion  in  consumption,  of course).  At the  other  extreme,
take  a good  with a  very  high  elasticity  of supply. The introduction  of  a
small  but  finite  tariff  on this  good  will  cause  the  supply  to shrink  by a
large  amount. The  cost  per  dollar  of revenue  is  high  even  at low  tariff
rates. But If  protection  is  the  objective,  large  supply  response  is  good  in
that  it  helps  attain  the  objective  at a lower  tariff  rate  than  will  be the
case  if  supply  was Inelastic.
121.4  Importance  o.f  tJh  Binding  Constraint
In  most  practical  situations,  countries  pursue  more than  one  objective.
.,us,  even though  revenue  may  figure  prominently  in  discussions  on trade
policy  reforms,  protection  as an objective  is  almost  always  present  In  the
background.  Under  such  circumstances,  optimal  tariff  structure  will  be
determined  by the  binding  constraint.  If the  optimal  tariffs  to  raise  the
desired  revenue  also  fulfill  the  protection  objective,  revenue  constraint  Is
the  binding  one.  Similarly,  if  optimal  tariffs  for  protection  allow  the
country  to raise  the  desired  revenue,  protection  constraint  Is  the  binding
one. Ramsey  considerations  will  be Important  In the  former  case  but  not In
the latter. Finally,  if  both  constraints  are  binding,  we must  superimpose  the
revenue-raising  optimal  tariffs  on optimal  protective  tariffs.
2.  Imported  Intermediate  Inputs
Let  us now turn  to  the  Issue  of taxation  of Intermediate  Inputs  and
provision  of duty  drawbacks  on exports.  i  Initially  assume  that  there  are two
'Mnal  goods  and  one intermediate  Input  which  Is  not  produced  at home. The
nput  Is  used In  both  final  goods. We seek  to answer  the  following  questions:
(i) Assuming  a positive  tariff  on the  final  good  but  not  on the  input,
is  it  welfare  improving  to introduce  a tariff  on the  latter?
(ii) What If the  tariff  on the  Input  is  accompanied  by a duty  drawback
on  exports?
(ill) What Is the  answer  to (II)  when  we want  to  hold the  revenue
constant?
(iv) Now  suppose  that  there  Is  another  exportable  which  does  not  use the
irimr)orted  input. How  do our  answers  to (II)  and (ill)  change?
15The  results  In this  section  are  derived  formally  In  Panagariya  (1989).
13(v)  Finally,  suppose  that  In the  Initial  equilibrium,  there  are tariffs
on final  as  well  as Intermediate  imports. Will the  introduction  of the  duty
drawback  on  exports  have  a welfare  Improving  effect  in  this  situation?
Let  us take  each  of these  questions  in turn.
(1) As noted  In  the  first  paragraph  of this  section,  let  us assume  that
there  are two  final  goods  and  an Imported  intermediate  input.1  The importable
good Is  subject  to  a tariff  at rate  t.  Now  suppose  that  we Introduce  a tariff
on the  Input  at rate  T.  As the  country  is  small,  this  tariff  will  leave  the
domestic  relative  price  of the  final-import  good  unchanged  at 1+t;  the
dlstortion  in  consumption  will  remain  unaffected.  The tariff  on the  Input
will,  however,  affect  the  distortion  In  production.  The  distortion  will  get
worse  or better  depending  on the  relative  Intensity  with  which  the  Input  Is
used In  the  two  goods  and  the  initial  tariff  on the  final  Importable.
Specifically,  I  demonstrate  In the  appendix  that  the  tariff  on the  input
improves  or w;orsens  welfare  as aI/(l+t)  Is larger  or smaller  than  a2  where  aI
denotes  the  quantity  of input  used  per  unit  of  output  of good I (i  =  1,  2).
In  the  former  case,  introduction  of a tariff  on the  input  raises  the
production  cost  of  good 1 relative  to that  of  good  2 and  reduces  the
anti-export  bias  which  exists  due to the  initial  tariff  on  good 1.
(ll) Next,  consider  the  combined  effect  of the  input  tariff  and  a  duty
drawback  on exports. In  this  case  firms  will receive  a  price  equal  to  1+ra2
for  exports. Competitive  pressure  will imply  that  the  price  in the  domestic
market  rise  to the  same level. Thus,  from  the  production  standpoint,  the
higher  production  cost  of  exportables  resulting  from  the  tariff  on the  input
is  exactly  offset  by the  higher  price  received  for the  final  product. By
contrast,  the  importable  does  suffer  from  the  extra  cost.  Thus,  the  net
16We will  assume  throughout  the  paper  that  value  added  and  the  intermediate
input  are  used in  constant  proportions.
14effect  on the  supply  side is  a contraction  of the  importable,at  the  expense  of
the  exportable  which  by itself  is  welfare  Improving. In  addition,  the  rise  In
the  domestic  price  of the  exportable  leads  to  a decline  In  the  consumption  of
the  exportable  which  reduces  distortion  in  consumption.
Analytically,  the  effect  of the  tariff  on input  at rate  Tr combined  with  a
duty  drawback  on exports  is identical  to that  of a production  tax  at rate  Ta
on the  importable  and  a consumption  tax  at rate  Ta 2 on the  exportable. Both
changes  are  welfare  improving.
(iii) Now suppose  that  we introduce  the  revenue  constraint. It is  easy
to  see  that in  this  case  the  welfare  gains  from  the  tariff  on the  input
combined  with  a duty  drawback  will  be larger  than  in (ii). As seen in (ii),
these  measures  expand  trade. Therefore,  at constant  t, revenues  from
*inal-good  imports  must  rise. Moreover,  the  duty  drawback  applies  to  exports
aly. Duties  collected  on inputs  used in  the  domestically  sold  exportable  and
ie  importable  add  further  to revenues. It  follows  that  if  revenue  is  to  be
ld  constant,  the  tariff  on the  final  importable  can  be reduced. This
'duction  in the  tariff  will confer  further  gains.  17
(iv) Let  us now  Introduce  another  exportable  which  does  not  use the
imported  Input. A common  concern  is  that  the  tariff  on input  combined  with  a
duty  drawback  on exports  may  cause  a contraction  of this  other  export  and
lower  welfare. It  can  be shown,  however,  that  as long  there  are  no other
distortions  in the  economy,  the  welfare  effect  of a small  tariff  with  duty
1  This  analysis  Is  based  on the  assumption  that  the  economy  is  not  in the
Laffer  range. That is  to  say, the  initial  tariff  rate  on the  final  good is
not  so  high that  a reduction  in the  tariff  rate  increases  revenue. If the
economy  Is in  the  Laffer  range,  a reduction  in the  tariff  will increase  both
revenue  and  welfare  without  any  complementary  measures.
15aiawback  will  be unambiguously  positive  both  with  and  without  the  revenue
constraint.  For large  (noninfinitesimal)  changes,  the  effect  on welfare  is
ambiguous  in  general  but the  conditions  under  which  welfare  declines  are
strong. For  example  if the  initial  tariff  on the  final  Import  is large  or if
the  two  exportables  are  unrelated  in  demand,  welfare  must  rise. Each  of these
two  conditions  is  sufficient  but  far  from  necessary  to  ensure  welfare
improvement.
(v) Finally,  suppose  that  the  initial  equilibrium  Is  characterized  by
tariffs  on both  the  importable  and  the  intermediate  input. In this  setting,
the  effect  of the  drawback  Is  exactly  the  same  as that  of an export  subsidy  to
the  exportable  using  the input. Therefore,  the  drawback  raises  the  domestic
price  of the  exportable  which,  in turn,  raises  output  and lowers  consumption
of the  good.  In  a two-final-goods  model,  this  change  will  be necessarily
welfare  improving.  When  we have two  exportables  and  one importable  where  one
exportable  does  not  use  the  input,  a small  duty  drawback  Is  necessarily
welfare  improving  while  the  effect  of a large  (noninfinitesimal)  duty  drawback
is  ambiguous  in  general. In the  latter  case,  conditions  under  which  welfare
can  decline  are  rather  strong  so that  the  presumption  is in favor  of a rise  in
welfare.
In  concluding  this  section  it  may  be noted  that  in  the  presence  of a
revenue  constraint,  optimal  tariffs  wlll  be  nonuniform  in  general. In
particular,  we will  want to  tax the  imports  of intermediate  input  and  final
goods  at  different  rates. This  conclusion  holds  true  even  when  we allow  for
duty  drawbacks  on exports. To illustrate  the  point  most  simply,  suppose  that
there  is  one  final  import  and  one intermediate  input. Assume  further  that  the
input  is  used In the  final  importable  only  and that  a  given  revenue  is raised
via  a  uniform  tariff  on the  two  imports. The  net  effect  of this  tariff  will
be to  restrict  final  imports  below  the  free  trade  level. Therefore,  if  we
raise  the  tariff  on the  intermediate  input  by a small  amount  and  lower  that  on
16-he  final  good  just  enough  to  hold the  revenue  constant,  Imports  rise  and
elfare  Improve  unambiguously.  Thus,  the  uniform  tariff  is  shown  to  be
nonoptimal.
3.  Nontraded  Goods
Let  us  now Introduce  a nontraded  goods  sector. The  results  with respect
to  all  four  objectives  discussed  in  Section  1  remain  valid  here. Therefore
the  principal  new  question  of interest  is  whether  the  intermediate  inputs  used
by this  sector  should  be subject  to tariff. This  question  has  been  analyzed
by  Ramaswami  and  Srinivasan  (RS)  (1968)  In  a one-factor,  four-good  model  of a
small  open  economy. The  four  goods  are:  a  pure  final  importable  (not
produced  at home),  a  pure  exportable  (not  consumed  at  home),  a nontraded  good,
and  an Imported  Input  used in the  latter  two  goods.  RS assume  that  the
country  produces  two  goods,  a pure  exportable  (not  consumed  at home)  and  a
nontraded  good.  In  this  setting,  RS demonstrate  that  If  the  government  wants
to raise  a constant  proportion  of income  In  revenues,  the  optimal  trade  policy
will involve  (i)  nonuniform  tariffs  on Imports  of the  final  good  and  the
Intermediate  input  and (ll)  duty  drawback  on the  use  of the  intermediate  input
in  exports.
The  basic  RS result  that  revenue  raising  optimal  trade  taxes  must include
a positive  tariff  on the  use  of the  intermediate  input  in  the  nontraded  goods
sector  can  be shown  to hold  in  more  general  models. Specifically,  it is  not
necessary  to  assume  that  the  export  good  is  not  consumed  and  the  import  good
is  not  produced  at home.
4.  The  Uniform  Tariff  Issue  Further  Considered
4.1  The  Case  Against  a Uniform  Tariff
Our  discussion  In the  previous  sections  demonstrates  that  the  only  clear
case  where  a uniform  tariff  can  be  defended  on  grounds  of efficiency  arises
17when the  objective  of trade  policy  is to  restrict  the  value  of imports  at
world  prices  (i.e.  self-sufficiency).  Unfortunately,  this  case  has  only
limited  applicability  in  actual  trade  re.orms. Usually,  self-sufficiency  is
not the  principal  motive  behind  trade  restrictions.
The  most important  objectives  behind  trade  restrictions  In  developing
countries  are revenue  and  protection. In  the  case  of revenue,  we have  seen
that  uniform  tariffs  have  no  hope  of being  optimal.  Under  the  protection
constraint,  the  analysis  in  Section  1.2  shows  that  uniform  tariffs  could  be
optimal  provided  we are  willinz  to lgnore  the  distortion  In  consumption.  But
even this  weak case  is  undermined  by at least  three  factors.
First,  smuggling  is  an Integral  part  of international  trade  flows  in  a
majority  of developing  countries. It  can  be safely  asserted  that  all  goods
cannot  be smuggled  with  uniform  ease (or  unease!) For instance,  a 30  percent
uniform  tariff  will  surely  lead  to less  effective  protection  for  wrist  watches
than  for  automobiles. Therefore,  a uniform  tariff  will  normally  fail  to
achieve  in  practice  what It  Is  expected  to  achieve  in theory.
Second,  most  developing  countries  employ  domestic  taxes  such  as excise
duty  or value  added  tax. As is  well recognized,  these  taxes  will influence
the  degree  of protection  implied  by a  given  set  of tariffs. Therefore,  unless
one  makes  the  domestic  taxes  uniform  at the  same  time  as trade  taxes  are  made
uniform,  marginal  distortion  costs  of  protection  in  production  will  not  be
equalized  across  industries.
Finally,  optimality  of  uniform  tariffs  In  the  presence  of the  protection
objective  (ignoring  the  distortion  costs  in  consumption)  depends  critically  on
18As  noted  earlier,  tariffs  are  not  the  first  best instrument  for  raising
revenue. In  our  framework,  revenue  can  be raised  costlessly  by taxing
consumption  or value  added  at a  uniform  rate.
18the  assumptions  of constant  returns  to  scale  and  perfect  competition.  Both  of
these  assumptions  are  patently  false  In  many industries  in  developing
countries. Most  countries  have Industries  that  exhibit  Increasing  returns  and
are  subject  to  entry  regulations  by the  government. In  many  cases,  the
Industry  Is  a  government  monopoly. Under  such  circumstances,  we cannot  rely
upon the  conventional  logic  to  evaluate  the  cost  of protection  imposed  by a
given  set  of tariffs. Recent  research  has  shown  that  the  presence  of
economies  of scale  and Imperfect  competition  alters  many  of the  conventional
results  dramatically.
4.2  The  Case  for  a Uniform  Tariff
In  view  of these  considerations,  the  case  for  a  uniform  tariff  cannot  be
made  on  grounds  of efficiency  In the  conventional  sense. Instead,  such  a case
must  be based  on (1)  transparency  and  administrative  simplicity  and (ii)  the
ability  of uniform  tariffs  to  deter  the  directly  unproductive  activities  aimed
at obtaining  higher  tariffs. Let  me elaborate  upon  these  points.
First,  If  tariffs  are  uniform,  there  is  no  question  concerning  the  race
at which  tariff  is  to  be paid.  This  fact  minimizes  the incentive  to
misclassify  goods  and  enables  customs  authorities  to  concentrate  on ensuring
that  the  value  of  goods  Is  not  understated.  Delays  in  clearing  goods  for
delivery  will  be reduced  which  is likely  to  generate  significant  gains
especially  when the  goods  are  to  be used in  the  production  of exports.
Uniformity  in  tariffs  may  also  lead  to  simplification  in import  procedures  and
elimination  of an intricate  tariff  code  as  a barrier  to  entry. A  potential
investor  does  not  have  to invest  resources  in  figuring  complex  tariff
regulations  or in  finding  creative  ways  to  bring  high  tariff  goods  under  the
guise  of low  tariff  goods.
Uniform  tariffs  may  also  help  minimize  directly  unproductive  activities
designed  to  obtain  higher  tariffs  for  at least  three  reasons. First,  an
19increase  in the  tariff  rate  brings  limited  gains  due to the  fact  that  tariffs
on lntermediate  Inputs  rise  at the  same  time  that  they  rise  on final  product.
Therefore,  the  Incentive  to invest  In  lobbying  is  reduced.
Second,  collective  action  Is  more likely  when  gains  from  such  an action
are  concentrated  and  when the  group  In  question  is  relatively  small  (Olson,
1965). If the  structure  of tariffs  is  not  subject  to  negotiation,  the  entire
Import  competing  sector  will  have  to  organize  in  order  to lobby  for  an
Increase  In the  (uniform)  tariff  rate. Difficulties  In  organizing  such  a
group  are  perhaps  as formidable  as those  encountered  In  organizing  consumer
lobbies. By contrast,  if  nonuniformity  in  tariff  Is  permitted,  an individual
Industry  can  organize  itself  at  a very low  cost  and  has  a better  chance  of
success. If the  tariff  rate  orn  all Imports  has  to  be raised  (as  will  be the
case  under  a uniform  tariff  regime),  export  and  nontraded  sectors  that  are
hurt  will  be sure to  take  notice  and  provide  counterforce  to the  efforts  aimed
at raising  the  tariff. By contrast,  If the  tariff  is  raised  for  one  Industry,
the  cost  of such  an action  for  an Individual  Industry  Is likely  to  be small
even though  the  total  cost  across  all  Industries  may  be quite  high.
Consequently,  very little  counterforce  will  be  provided. Or worse  still,  the
counterforce  will  take  the  form  of  demand  for  increased  protection  by
Industries  that  are  adversely  affected.
Finally,  it Is  easier  to  make  a case  for (more)  protection  when  someone
else  is  protected  by a higher  tariff. By contrast,  the  uniform  tariff  has  the
appearance  of being  equally  protective  of all import-competing  industries.
Admittedly,  export  Industries  are  negatively  protected  but  under  most
circumstances  the  desire  to  compensate  them  Is  not  very  strong.
These  arguments  suggest  that  in  the  long  run,  pressures  from  industries
are likely  to  escalate  protection  more  under  a uniform  than  under  a  nonuniform
tariff. If  this  hypothesis  is  correct,  a strong  case  can  be made  for  a
uniform  tariff  on the  ground  that  It  is likely  to  be associated  with  a lower
20average  level  of  protection  than  nonuniform  tariffs.
4.3  Evaluation
The  analysis  In  this  paper  demonstrates  that  the  optimal  structure  of
tariffs  aimed  at achieving  protection  and  revenue  objectives  Is  nonuniform.
The  presence  of smuggling,  economies  of scale  and imperfect  competition
further  weaken  an already  weak case  for  uniform  tariffs. The  principal
justification  for  uriform  tariffs  lies  in transparency,  administrative
simpllcity  and  relatively  low  level  of  directly-unproductive  profit-seeking
act'vities. Thus,  there  is  a conflict  between  the  Implications  of the
conventional  efficiency  analysis  and  political-economy  considerations.  In the
ultimate,  the  issue  is  empirical  and  more  systematic  work  needs  to  be done in
this  area.
5.  A  Summary  of the  Literature
In  this  section,  I  will  provide  a  brief  description  of the  literature  on
the  issues  considered  in the  present  paper.
To my knowledge,  the  first  detailed  investigatior.  of  cG?timal  tariff
structure  to  protect  a  group  of industries  was  presented  by Johnson  (1964)  In
a somewhat  neglected  but thought-provoking  paper  entitled  "Tariffs  and
Economic  Development:  Some  Theoretical  Issues'.1 9 In  this  paper,  Johnson
demonstrated  that  the  optimal  policy  for  protecting  a group  of lndustries  was
a uniform  subsidy,  not  uniform  tariff. He further  noted  that  a uniform  tariff
will  be optimal  if  the  policy  objective  was to restrict  imDorts  of a group  of
commnodities.  Johnson  also  discussed  in  detail  the  Importance  of intermediate
19Interestingly,  the  paper  was  published  as the  lead  article  in the  inaugural
issue  of the  Journal  of Development  Studies.
21inputs  in the  design  of tariff  policy  and  noted  the  formula  for  effective
protection  which  he called  the  "implicit  rate  of protection".
Johnson  did  not  analyze,  however,  the  optimal  tariff  problem  in the
presence  of the  revenue  constraint.  This task  was  undertaken  for the  first
time  by Ramaswami  and  Srinivasan  (RS)  (1968)  in  a one-factor,  four-good  model
of  a small  open  economy.  As noted  In  Section  4, RS assume  that  the  country
produces  two  goods,  a pure  exportable  (not  consumed  at  home)  and  a nontraded
good.  Both  goods  use  an imported  intermediate  Input  In  production. There  are
two  consumables,  the  nontraded  good  and  a pure  import  (not  produced  at  home).
In this  setting,  RS demonstrate  that  if  the  government  wants  to raise  a
constant  proportion  of income  in revenues,  the  optimal  trade  policy  will
Involve  (i)  nonuniform  tariffs  on imports  of the  final  good  and  the
Intermediate  input  and (11)  duty  drawback  on the  use  of the  Intermediate  input
in  exports.
The  problem  of revenue-neutral  optimal  tariffs  has  been  studied  in  a more
general  model  by Dasgupta  and  Stiglitz  (DS)  (1974). This  paper  and  some  of
the  subsequent  literature  (e.g.,  Dixit,  1985)  is  written  in the  Ramsey  (1927)
Diamond-Mirrlees  (1971),  Public  Economics  tradition.  DS allow  for  firm-ievel
profits  and the  results  depend  critically  on  whether  or not these  profits  can
be taxed  away  entirely. The  case  when  a 100  percent  profit  tax  Is levied  is
equivalent  to the  Diamond-Mirrlees  constant  returns  case. Assuming  that  the
the  only taxes  available  (other  than  the  profit  tax)  are trade  taxes,  DS
obtain  the  following  results. Ci)  If  a 100  percent  profit  tax  cannot  be
Imposed,  Intermediate  Inputs  should  be subject  to  trade  taxes  In  the  same  way
as the  final  goods  (DS  p. 15).  (ii)  If  a 100  percent  profit  tax  can  be
levied,  however,  "the  output  of intermediate  goods  should  not  be changed  from
what it  would  be at international  prices." "Goods  which  are  used  both  as
inputs  into  production  and  as consumption  goods  should  be taxed  (if  it Is
Impossible  to treat  the  same  good  differently  according  to  use)." Recently,
22Stern  (1987,  pp.  82-83)  has  argued  that  optimal  trade  taxes  do not Include
taxes  on intermediate  inputs. Corden  (1974,  pp.  70-76)  provices  intuitive
discussion  of optimal  tariffs  for  revenue  and  concludes,  contrary  to  Stern,
that  "an  optimum  revenue  tariff  struicture  Is likely  to include  tariffs  on
nputs".  20
Recently,  a series  of papers  written  at the  World  Bank  have  explored
further  the  issue  of optimal  tariff  structure.  Dahl  et al (1986)  employ  a
lti-factor  multi-commodity  model  In  which  all  factor  are  supplied  in fixed
intities  and there  are  no Intermediate  inputs. They  derive  optimal  tariffs
-essary  to raise  a fixed  revenue  and  demonstrate  several  analogies  between
-h  tariffs  and  Ramsey  taxes. Mitra  (1987)  gives  explicit  consideration  to
Ler-industry  flows. He derives  optimal  tariffs  in the  presence  revenue
objective  as  well as  protection  constraint.  Both  Dahl  et al and  Mitra
experiment  with  computable  general  equilibrium  models  and  derive  optimal
21 garlffs  in  specific  cases.'  Another  paper,  written  by  Chambers  (1989),
ploys  a model  similar  to that  in  Ramaswami  and  Srinivasan  and  derives
conditions  under  which  uniform  tariffs  are  optimal.22  Not surprisingly,  these
-onditions  are  very  stringent  and  unlikely  to  be met  except  by accident.
Chambers  also  discusses  in  detail  the  welfare  implications  of imposing  a
*  riff  on the  intermediate  input. Finally,  mention  may  be made  of Harberger
\lso  see  Corden  (1982).
21 Mention  may  also  be m-ade  here  of Heady  and  Mitra  (1985).
'2Chambers'  model  is  more  general  in  one  way  but less  so in  another. Thus,
*nlike  RS he allows  for  the  production  of the  importable  and  consumption  of
the  exportable.  But  while  RS distinguish  between  tariffs  on the  use  of the
intermediate  input  in  exportable  and  nontraded  good,  he employs  a single
tariff  on the  intermediate  input.
23(1988),  Shalizi  and  Squire  (1988)  and  Balassa  (1989)  who  provide  analytic
discussions  of these  issues,  although  without  recourse  to  formal  models.
Before  concluding  this  section,  reference  may  be made  to two  additional
bodies  of literature.  First,  some  of the  earlier  trade  theoretic  literature
which  appeared  under  the  title  of "noneconomic  objectives"  dealt  with Issues
very  similar  to those  discussed  in the  literature  cited  above. Thus,  Bhagwati
I  Srinivasan  (1969)  provide  a systematic  discussion  of optimal  Intervention
licies  In the  presence  of import,  protection  and  consumption  objectives  In  a
two-sector  model. The  principal  Insight  In this  paper  is  that  the  optimal
lethod  of achieving  an objective  is  to  choose  that  policy  which  affects  the
objective  directly. Thus,  tariffs  are  the  first  best Instrument  to restrict
Imports,  production  subsidies  to  protect  a given  set  of industries  and
onsumption  taxes  to restrict  consumption.  Tan (1971)  generalizes  the
3hagwati-Srinivasan  analysis  to  models  incorporating  inter-industry  flows,
Imported  Intermediate  inputs  and  nontraded  goods. Finally,  Vandendorpe  (1974)
extends  the  analysis  to  a multi-commodity  framework.  He demonstrates  that  in
a  small  open  economy,  if the  instrument  chosen  to  achieve  an objective  is
optimal,  the  tax  or subsidy  on  various  goods  should  be at a uniform  rate.
This literature  has  been  synthesized  and  refined  in  the  well-known  survey  by
Bhagwati  (1971). Dixit  and  Norman  (1980,  ch.  6) provide  a mathematical
treatment  of the  same  issues  using  the  dual  approach.
SeLond,  the  literature  on  partial  reforms  seeks  to  analyze  the  welfare
effects  of small  changes  in  the  tariff  rate  given  an Initially  distorted
equilibrium.  The  seminal  contribution  here Is  the  paper  by Bertrand  and  Vanek
)71)  which  demonstrates  that  equalization  of the  highest  tariff  to the  next
ghest  one Improves  welfare  as long  as  net import  demands  do not  exhibit
nplementarlties.  Additional  contributions  to  this  literature  include  Bruno
(1972),  Lloyd (1974),  Fukushima  (1979),  Smith  (1980)  and  Dixit  (1985).
246.  Summary  of the  Paper
The  following  are  the  main  results  discussed  In  Sections  1-3.
First,  If  a country  wishes  to limit  the  value  (at  world  prices)  of some
or all  of Its  imports,  the  first  best  optimal  policy  Is  a uniform  tariff.
This  result  holds  under  very  general  conditions.
Second,  if the  objective  Is  protection  to  a group  of industries,  the
first  best is  a  uniform  output  subsidy  provided  revenue  can  be raised
costlessly. If  revenue  cannot  be raised  costlessly,  the  optimal
revenue-raising  taxes  must  be superimposed  on the  uniform  subsidy. In  the
event  that  the  country  lacks  the  ability  to  use  domestic  taxes,  tariffs  will
become  the  first-best  instrument  for  protection.  The  optimal  structure  of
such  tariffs  will  be nonuniform.
Third,  optimal  instruments  for  raising  revenue  are  rather  sensitive  to
model  specification.  If  rents  are  absent  but labor-leisure  choice  is  present
as in  Diamond  and  Mirrlees,  the  optimal  instrument  is  a consumption  tax  or
subsidy  on goods  as  well as  factors. If rents  are  present  however,  optimal
instruments  Include  both  consumption  and  trade  (or  production)  taxes. If  all
factor  supplies  are  fixed,  a uniform  tax  on consumption  or value  added  must  be
used.
Fourth,  assuming  fixed  endowments  and  no  domestic  taxes,  optimal  tariffs
to raise  a fixed  re'venue  will  be nonuniform.  This  conclusion  remains  valid
even  If  we ignore  the  distortion  in  consumption.
Fifth,  revenue-neutral  trade  taxes  will  generally  include  tariffs  and
subsidies  on intermediate  inputs. Broadly  speaking,  tariffs  on intermediate
Inputs  combined  with  duty  drawbacks  on exports  are  welfare  improving  both  with
and  without  revenue  constraint.  As a  general  rule,  a policy  change  that
causes  the  output  to  fall  and  consumption  to rise  In the  protected  sector  is
welfare  Improving.
25Finally,  I  have  discussed  (Section  4) In  detail  the  case  for  and  against
uniform  tariffs. My main  conclusion  Is that  the  conventional  efficiency
criteria  point  towards  nonuniformity  in  tariffs  while  transparency,
administrative  convenience  and  political  economy  considerations  point  in  the
opposite  direction. In  view  of this  conflict,  the  Issue  of desirability  of
uniform  tariffs  Is  ultimately  empirical.  More  work In  this  area is  required.
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